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Abstract: This paper assesses Löwith’s conception of 
Antiquity. For him Antiquity is opposite in meaning to 
Christianity, and not to Modernity. That is to say, Moder-
nity would be included in the Christian times, and Antiq-
uity, for its part, would be primarily considered as a poly-
theist culture, contrasting with the Christian worldview. 
As I will show, the scheme motivating such a conception 
of Antiquity is the Nietzschean antichristian philosophical 
program. 
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1. Antiquity versus Christianity  
 
 It was only when Karl Löwith wrote Meaning in His-
tory (1949) that he first outlined a general theory on An-
tiquity. This theory was further developed in his work 
Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis (1955) and finally summa-
rized in Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von 
Descartes bis zu Nietzsche (1966). Nonetheless, Löwith 
was indeed interested in the ancient world from the early 
stages of his work. His interest in Antiquity may not have 
been straightforward, but, as it will be argued in what fol-
lows, the roots of his thought can be traced back to 
Nietzsche, since for both philosophers Antiquity is oppo-
site in meaning to Christianity, and not to Modernity. 
That is to say, Modernity would be included in the Chris-
tian times, and Antiquity, for its part, would be primarily 
considered as a polytheist culture and a way of thinking, 
contrasting with the Christian worldview. To that extent, 
Christianity, as the crucial event of the Western, is the 
main concern of Löwith’s thought, as well as of 
Nietzsche’s.   
 It is well known that from Also sprach Zarathustra on, 
but not before, Nietzsche took Christianity (and not the 
history of metaphysics, like many heideggerian scholars 
use to claim) as the decisive, wicked event in the cultural 
history of the Western civilization. Some popular exam-
ples that illustrate this stance are the following:  
 
The symbol of this struggle, inscribed in letters legible across all 
human history, is ‘Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome’: — 
there has hitherto been no greater event than this struggle, this 
question, this deadly contradiction (Genealogie der Moral, 16)  
This eternal indictment of Christianity I will write on all walls, 
wherever there are walls — I have letters to make even the blind 
see. I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great inner-
most corruption, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no 
means is poisonous, stealthy, subterranean, small enough — I 
call it the one immortal blemish of mankind (Der Antichrist, 62). 
 
Ecce Homo concludes:  
 
‘Have I been understood? — Dionysus versus the Crucified…’1  
 
Nietzsche remained for Löwith the essential philosopher 
and he assumed his antichristian philosophical program2. 
In 1914, at the age of 17, he joined the German Army af-
ter his intense reading of Nietzsche; in 1923 he wrote his 
thesis on Nietzsche, in a period when the philosopher 
from Röcken was barely been taken into account by 
scholars; from 1928 to 1934, he taught his philosophical 
thinking in Marburg on several occasions; in 1935 he 
wrote a book about Nietzsche’s philosophy, Nietzsches 
Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, when 
he was expelled from Germany; in 1941, he published in 
Japan a history of the revolutionary german thought enti-
tled Von Hegel bis zu Nietzsche. Without doubt, Nietzsche 
plays a crucial role in both Meaning in History (1949) and 
Gott, Mensch und Welt in der Metaphysik von Descartes 
bis zu Nietzsche (1966), and during the 1960s Löwith put 
Giorgio Colli and Massimo Montinari in touch with the 
publishing house De Gruyter, which finally published the 
Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA) including the findings of 
Colli and Montinari in the Weimar Archiv. In short, 
Nietzsche was the main reference of the whole work of 
Löwith from the very beginning. And Löwith himself ac-
knowledged it3. He accepted the Nietzschean diagnosis4 
and attempted to overcome Christianity in order to find a 
way out to the Western civilizational crisis.  
 Although Nietzsche attempted to be as antichristian as 
possible, Löwith contended that such an undertaking 
ended in failure. Claiming himself to be an antichristian, 
Nietzsche remained Christian, all too Christian5. Löwith 
considered that Zarathustra could be read as an inverted 
Gospel and was convinced that the inversion of something 
makes this movement subordinate to what is attempted to 
be overcame. Nietzsche could have written some kind of 
Iliad, History of the Peloponnesian War or De Rerum 
Natura, but he wrote a Gospel. Although antichristian, it 
remains a Gospel6. Moreover, Löwith emphasized that the 
Nietzschean idea of Wille zum Macht is not compatible 
with the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same7. 
Löwith rejected the idea of Wille zum Macht but he 
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claimed that Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal recurrence of 
the same, if not fully and coherently exposed, can only be 
understood in the context of this Nietzschean battle 
against Christianity, because the eternal recurrence of the 
same is essentially an antichristian idea. This is why 
Löwith, following and surpassing Nietzsche, enhanced 
this idea and claimed a new world image, which is the 
same of the ancients8, without the overenthusiastic and 
unconsciously christian-based Nietzschean impulse and 
prophetic writing.   
 
 
2. The Idea of Sattelzeit  
 
Being a disciple of Löwith, Reinhart Koselleck translated 
Meaning in History into German in 1953. In his early 
writings9, he showed that there was a period of Sattelzeit 
in the European history from 1750 to 1850. By this time, 
all socio-political concepts underwent both a paradigm 
shift and a process of resemantization. This methodologi-
cal caution motivates us to take distance from the con-
cepts to be found in the texts preceding that date. Even if 
the word we find remains unchanged, the semantics and 
the whole paradigm in which the concept once made 
sense are now different. These concepts must be therefore 
translated into our modern language. Consequently, the 
first task of the researcher is to keep in mind the several 
layers of meaning behind the concept. Since continuity in 
words does not entail any persistence in the meaning, a 
difference is to be faced and understood as such, being 
therefore suspicious about the tale of continuity of ideas.   
 Koselleck made an attempt at explaining the profound 
changes relating to the period 1750-1850 through the con-
cept of Sattelzeit. According to Löwith, and even if he did 
not use that word, Christianity introduced a Sattelzeit in 
history. Concepts such us history, atheism, belief, faith, 
wisdom, philosophy, world, divineness or scepticism do 
not convey the same meaning in the pre-Christian world 
and in the Christian and post-Christian one. Despite the 
fact that the word is the same, the general axiological 
frame displaces the meaning. For these concepts refer to 
another context of meaning we should be aware of it in 
order to avoid projecting our common understanding of 
these words into those texts on Antiquity. I will offer 
some examples on the basis of Löwith texts:  
 His tory .  In Meaning in History, Löwith distin-
guishes between logos of the cosmos and Lord of the his-
tory, being polytheistic Greeks and Romans concerned 
with the former and monotheistic Jews and Christians 
with the latter10. For Greeks and Romans, history means 
political history, but for Jews and Christians, the same 
terms refers to the history of salvation. Greeks and Ro-
mans understand the past as an everlasting foundation, 
whilst Jews and Christians as a promise to the future. The 
intellectual figure for Greeks and Romans is the political 
historian; for Jews and Christians, the prophet. In short, 
the ancient world did not develop a philosophy of history, 
which relies completely on the history of salvation11. The 
modern philosophy of history goes for the Lord of the his-
tory12. 
 Rel ig ion .  Religions in Antiquity did not speak the 
language of belief. The correctness of religion was practi-
cal (orthopraxis), not theoretical (orthodoxy). Here 
Löwith agrees with the etymology of the word religion 
offered by Benveniste13. Cicero’s etymology corresponds 
to a polytheistic world; Lactantius’ one, to a monotheist 
world. The fact that Antiquity did not speak the language 
of belief explains why the gods were a tool of communi-
cation between the different peoples14. When two human 
communities approached each other (because of the war, 
conquest or commerce), they usually translated their pan-
theons. The basic assumption until the emergence of the 
monotheistic religions was then that a translation of the 
gods was always available. On the contrary, Yahweh, 
God and Allah could not and cannot be translated; unlike 
Zeus, Jupiter, Tinia or Amun, they are not mutually trans-
latable. Many philosophies of the Antiquity, specially 
those of the platonic tradition, aim to the one God, but 
they do allow the translation. Due to this polytheistic 
background, they do not defend monotheism, but the 
unity of God; they do not deny the existence of many 
Gods, while the monotheistic religion does. The following 
motto summarizes the differences: “polytheism some-
times aims to the one God; monotheism always aims to 
the only God”. Furthermore, Löwith stated that he discov-
ered Greek and Roman polytheism during his exile in Ja-
pan. There, in Japan, he found the worship of the every-
day phenomena, like the sun, the moon, the nature, the 
sexuality, etc15. Löwith held that the Japanese kami can be 
put at the same level of the Roman superiori. Thus, the 
general comparison is not made exclusively between An-
tiquity and Christianity, but between, on the one hand, a 
polytheism distanced from our tradition (Japan) and a 
polytheism close to us (Greece and Rome), and, on the 
other hand, the Jewish and Christian monotheism. 
 The debates  be tween  reason  and fa i th .  This 
question surmises that reason needs to relate to faith. But 
where there is neither faith nor belief, as it was in the an-
cient Greece or Rome16, no pertinent question regarding 
the superiority of reason over faith could be raised. This 
conflict, believed to be the essential conflict of the West-
ern history, is not so decisive for Löwith, precisely be-
cause the two contrasting elements are not equal. Athens 
did not need Jerusalem to understand itself until it was 
defeated by monotheism. Conversely, the prosperous 
monotheism of Jerusalem always needed Athens to attain 
self-understanding. Because of the role played by Athens 
and the Antiquity during centuries within the Christian 
and Jew traditions, the comparison is unfair. In other 
words, Greece and Rome do not compare themselves with 
the Jew and Christian traditions17. To the best of my 
knowledge, there was and there is no platonic Church, 
sovereign in a philosophical State, having embassies in 
foreign countries, enjoying tax privilegies and resorting to 
platonic texts as the ultimate source of authority in poli-
tics, science, gender policies and religion. Monotheistic 
religions, and specially the Catholic Church, do. In order 
to understand the dialectics between Athens and Jerusa-
lem, a focus on the institutions needs to be done. Athens 
and the Antiquity played, and still do, a role within the 
current institutions. When considered historically and by 
itself, Athens was not aware of the tensions, fractures and 
depths of Jerusalem. Athens’s main concern was not the 
relationship between faith and raison, but the differences 
between doxa, episteme, pistis, skepsis, etc.18  
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 Atheism means in Antiquity distance of the commu-
nity from the religious ground, and it relates to social and 
political issues. As a matter of fact, the early Christians 
were found guilty of atheism, because they did not recog-
nise and worship the gods of the Roman Empire. Only 
after the emergence of Christianity, atheism acquires a 
completely different meaning. Orthodoxy emerges, and 
consequently heresies, believers, true believers, false be-
lievers, non believers and atheists –a new form of athe-
ism19–. The religious difference in relation to belief, 
which creates heresies, cannot be found in the polytheistic 
world. Thus, a new form of atheism enters in the world 
history through this religious difference in relation to be-
lief, namely the one we “naturally” understand. Here a 
striking example: Diogenes Laërtius in his Lives and 
Opinions uses the word heresies in the title to describe the 
numerous philosophical groups that simply held different 
opinions.   
 Greek  phi losophy  does neither seek to prove the 
existence of the gods nor to rationally justify the religious 
beliefs. The aim of Greek philosophy is rather to know 
the divineness better than the popular religion of the 
communities20. If one attempts to picture the ancient phi-
losophers, they should look more like the Indian wise 
men21 than like the medieval and modern philosophers 
linked to the universities and dedicated to commentary 
and analysis of texts. It is not just a coincidence that the 
ancient world was essentially an oral culture that did not 
“invent” the separation of words. The wisdom was not 
proved through the depths of the soul, but through the se-
renity of the old wise men.   
 Scept ic ism  in the ancient world means examination, 
investigation, search for the truth. Scepticism, as a way of 
life, was not a method of thinking or the systematic and 
epistemological doubt about the human capacity of know-
ing the truth. Scepticism was condensed by a doctor, Sex-
tus Empiricus, whose main concern was not theoretical or 
epistemological, but practical. The ancient sceptic 
searched for the truth, and did not use scepticism as a tool 
in the search for certainty, conviction or belief.   
 Those distinctions and this precomprehension of the 
Sattelzeit can be tracked in many modern philosophers. In 
Religion within the Boundaries of the Mere Reason, Kant 
differentiated the religion of the mere cult and obser-
vances from the religion of the good life conduct. Hegel, 
for its part, differentiated in his Lectures on the Philoso-
phy of Religion the determine religions from the consum-
mate religion. Nietzsche differentiated the slave and mas-
ter moralities in On the Genealogy of Morals. Kant and 
Hegel positively assessed this historical change, whilst 
Nietzsche assessed it negatively. At all events, the phi-
losophy of Löwith, following the line of Nietzsche’s 
thought, can be understood as a warning to keep the dif-
ferences and not to project the common meaning of our 
words onto Antiquity. We see the same words and we as-
sume the continuity between the philosophy of Plato and 
our time, but in Antiquity concepts such as atheism, be-
lief, heresy, philosophy of history, religion, monotheism, 
scepticism or even philosophy, in the way we spontane-
ously understand them, are nowhere to be found. The ax-
iological references and the context of meaning is com-
pletely different. After the triumph of the Christian faith, 
the concepts of the Greek and Roman philosophy need to 
be translated and we need to keep the Antiquity at a dis-
tance so that it can be properly understood.   
 
 
3. The Critique of Modernity and the Concept of 
Nature  
 
The examples outlined above allowed Löwith for warning 
us against the sharp separation between Antiquity and us. 
Moreover, he postulated that modern philosophy does not 
imply breaking away with Christianity22, and thus return-
ing to the ancient philosophy, but that modern philosophy 
from Descartes to Heidegger ambiguously continues to 
pursue the Lord of the history, and not the logos of the 
cosmos. In this regard, religion is understood as ortho-
doxy, not as orthopraxis; the relationship between faith 
and raison still galvanizes the debates; scepticism de-
scribes a method of thinking, not a way of life... Moder-
nity can be seen as a prolongation of the Christian world-
image. In this process, the idea of Sattelzeit helped us to 
note the differences between the ancient and the Christian 
worlds. This could be described as a triviality suitable for 
a degree student. But Löwith is interested in showing that 
our conceptual constellation comes from the break that 
Christianity introduced in history23. Since then, philoso-
phy has no longer resorted to the ancients. Modern phi-
losophy is both Christian and antichristian. It is Christian 
because it does not break up with the main themes of 
Christianity, namely the existence of God, the immortality 
of the soul, the divisions reason/faith, eternal/temporary, 
etc. And it is at the same time antichristian because it at-
tempts to prove them using no religious means at all24. 
The key point for Löwith is that modern philosophy does 
not resort to the classical topics of ancient philosophy. 
According to him, the main topic of ancient philosophy 
was nature25. Nature was considered by the ancients as the 
highest object of thinking26 and for that philosophy should 
be understood in the same way as it was when it was born 
in Greece: that is, as physiology. The ancients, from the 
pre-Socratics to Pliny, could still think that there was 
nothing highest or more divine than nature; but the mod-
erns, having lived in a monotheistic tradition for so many 
centuries (since Augustine at least), are not able any more 
to be amazed by the divineness and the simplicity of the 
natural world. From Augustine to Heidegger, the most 
striking object is not the world itself, but the self. Accord-
ing to Löwith, the world for the ancients is not the crea-
tion of a transcendent god or the making of the human 
mind, but “als das Ganze des Seienden ist die Welt immer 
schon vollständig und vollkommen selbständig und die 
Voraussetzung aller unselbständigen Existenzen”27. The 
world is not just an idea (Kant), an horizon (Husserl) or a 
projection (Heidegger), but the highest, the only existing 
and the divine world. Therefore, Modernity can be de-
fined as the time of the forgetfulness28 of nature. 
 From Descartes to Heidegger, no philosopher was ca-
pable to fully develop a suitable conception of nature29. 
Löwith’s critique of the close relationship between phi-
losophy and theology could be understood as a rejection 
of the survival of the latter in the former, in such a way 
that the permanent appropriation of theological concepts 
by the modern philosophy stopped it from conceiving na-
ture close to the ancient philosophy. In that way, the his-
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tory of modern thought shows that the ancient conception 
of nature, with the exception of some philosophers like 
Spinoza, Goethe or Nietzsche, has been long forgotten.   
 Any form of systematic and consistent atheism needs 
a new conceptualization of the world and the nature. It is 
not by chance that the most furious contemporary atheist, 
Michel Onfray, has recently published a book entitled 
Cosmos (2014). Every attempt to overcome Christianity 
and monotheism in general bumps into the necessity of 
drawing a new image of the cosmos and nature. An athe-
ist ontology seeking to exclude the afterlife and the tricks 
of religion demands a new image of the world, a new 
world image. The great danger for atheism is falling into 
the chains of Christianity, as evidenced by the example of 
Nietzsche and probably Onfray.   
Plessner, Leo Strauss and Gadamer among others have 
strongly criticized Löwith’s historical explanations. 
Plessner claims that it would bear a resemblance to the 
heideggerian one30. Leo Strauss in Notes on Lucretius31 
and Gadamer in Wahrheit und Methode32 hold that at-
tempting to return to the ancient conception of the nature 
at the peak of Modernity would be totally inappropriate. I 
also agree with the idea that it is impossible to return to 
the ancient idea of nature in the present33. But the central 
and still valuable idea of Löwith is that we have to keep in 
mind the gap between the ancients and the moderns and 
that the human being cannot find a solution to the con-
temporary political problems unless a new relationship 
with the nature is established34.    
 Löwith’s defense of the superiority of the ancient con-
ception of the nature only began after the exile and the 
Second World War. Before that time, in his early writ-
ings, there was no sign of pointing to the development of 
a concept of nature. Nonetheless, we can surely find con-
tinuity in Löwith’s philosophy from the twenties to the 
seventies in a concern that will easily drive him after the 
exile to the ancient world: the Nietzschean concern about 
the body, the Earth and the nature. That is, Löwith’s main 
philosophical interest did not change because of his 
forced stay in Japan and in the United States (1936-1952). 
However, considering that it had a Nietzschean origin, 
which can be trailed both before and after the exile in 
1936, these concerns led him to oppose the ancient and 
the Christian worlds — after the exile.   
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